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In three experiments pigeons played (i.e., chose between two colored keys) iterated prisoner's di-
lemma and other 2 X 2 games (2 participants and 2 options) against response strategies programmed
on a computer. Under the prisoner's dilemma pay-off matrix, the birds generally defected (i.e.,
pecked the color associated with not cooperating) against both a random response (.5 probability
of either alternative) and a tit-for-tat strategy (on trial n the computer "chooses" the alternative that
is the same as the one chosen by the subject on trial n - 1) played by the computer. They consistently
defected in the tit-for-tat condition despite the fact that as a consequence they earned about one
third of the food that they could have if they had cooperated (i.e., pecked the "cooperate " color)
on all the trials. Manipulation of the values of the food pay-offs demonstrated that the defection and
consequent loss of food under the tit-for-tat condition were not due to a lack of sensitivity to differ-
ences in pay-off values, nor to strict avoidance of a null pay-off (no food on a trial), nor to insensitivity
to the local (current trial) reward contingencies. Rather, the birds markedly discounted future out-
comes and thus made their response choices based on immediate outcomes available on the present
trial rather than on long-term delayed outcomes over many trials. That is, the birds were impulsive,
choosing smaller but more immediate rewards, and did not demonstrate self-control. Implications
for the study of cooperation and competition in both humans and nonhumans are discussed.
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Dubbed the E. coli of social psychology by
Axelrod (1980a), the prisoner's dilemma
game has become a popular research tool
and model of social interactions. Conflict sit-
uations from the interpersonal (e.g., Baefsky
& Berger, 1974; Baum & Gatchel, 1981) to
the international (Snyder & Diesing, 1977)
have been modeled, with varying degrees of
success, as prisoner's dilemma games.
The prisoner's dilemma game (actually
one class of 2 X 2 games) involves two players
who must each choose between two response
alternatives, generally called cooperation and
defection, without knowing what the other's
choice will be. Depending on the combina-
tion of choices made by the two players, each
receives one of four possible pay-offs-often
denoted S, P, R, and T-that satisfy the in-
equalities S < P < R < T, and R> (T + S)/
2. The pay-off structure of the prisoner's di-
lemma game is represented by the matrix in
Figure 1. The rows of the matrix represent
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Player 1's possible choices, and the columns
represent Player 2's possible choices. The cell
formed by the intersection of a row and col-
umn represents the outcome of that combi-
nation of choices and shows the resulting pay-
offs (assumed to be utilities), the first of
which is that earned by Player 1, and the sec-
ond ofwhich is that earned by Player 2. When
both players cooperate, each receives a mod-
erate pay-off, R, the "reward" for mutual co-
operation. When both players defect, each re-
ceives a smaller pay-off, P, the "punishment"
for mutual defection. When one player co-
operates and the other defects, the defecting
player earns the highest possible pay-off, T-
the "temptation" to defect-and the coop-
erating player earns the lowest possible pay-
off, S, commonly (and inappropriately)
known as the "sucker's" pay-off. Each player
in the prisoner's dilemma, regardless of what
the other chooses, earns a greater pay-off by
defecting than by cooperating. (With refer-
ence to Figure 1, defection as compared with
cooperation would yield five rather than
three should the opponent cooperate, and
one rather than zero should the opponent
defect.) In game-theory terms, defection is
said to dominate cooperation. The dilemma
arises because if both players defect, each re-
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Fig. 1. Pay-off matrix for the prisoner's dilemma game. In any given cell, the left number is the outcome for
Player 1, and the right number is the outcome for Player 2. Outcomes are in terms of positive utility.
ceives a pay-off of lower utility than if they
both cooperated (i.e., a pay-off of one rather
than three).
It is important to distinguish between a
one-shot prisoner's dilemma (in which the
players meet only once) and iterated games
(in which the players meet in a series of pri-
soner's dilemmas). Because defection domi-
nates cooperation, some consider it to be the
rational response in one-shot prisoner's di-
lemmas. In iterated games, however, the ra-
tional response-if rational implies optimal-
depends on the strategy of the other player.
If Player 2's strategy does not depend upon
Player 1's choices (is noncontingent), then it
is in Player l's long-term best interest to de-
fect on every trial. If Player 2 uses a strategy
of permanent retaliation, cooperating on ev-
ery trial until Player 1 defects and then de-
fecting on every trial thereafter, then Player
1 maximizes his or her long-term pay-off by
cooperating on every trial (with the excep-
tion of the last trial if it is known which is to
be the last). For this reason, the iterated pri-
soner's dilemma poses a more interesting
problem than the one-shot version, both for
players and for researchers. The present
study concerns this form of the prisoner's di-
lemma.
Recently, the prisoner's dilemma and other
game-theory models have been used to ac-
count for cooperative and competitive behav-
ior in nonhuman animals. In general, this
line of theorizing has been concerned with
the question of how cooperative behavior
could have evolved among populations of or-
ganisms that were initially noncooperative,
without invoking the concepts of group selec-
tion or kin selection (Maynard Smith, 1982).
One answer to this question has been that
there is a particular pattern of play in the pri-
soner's dilemma, commonly known as a tit-
for-tat strategy, that leads to mutual coopera-
tion and according to Axelrod and Hamilton
(1981) is evolutionarily stable. That is to say,
the tit-for-tat strategy can gain a foothold and
survive in initially noncooperative environ-
ments, and once established no individual
playing a different strategy can do as well.'
The tit-for-tat strategy dictates that an organ-
' However, see Selten and Hammerstein's (1984) ex-
planation of why it is not strictly true that TFT is an ev-
olutionarily stable strategy, Boyd and Lorberbaum's
(1987) argument for why no pure strategy can be evo-
lutionarily stable in the prisoner's dilemma game, and
Nowak and Sigmund's (1993) demonstration of how a
win-stay, lose-shift strategy (called "Pavlov") outperforms
TFT.
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ism cooperate on the trial after an opponent
has cooperated and defect on the trial after
an opponent has defected. Organisms that
play a tit-for-tat strategy receive higher pay-
offs overall in terms of their inclusive fitness
than those that do not. Over time, then, tit
for tat should, in theory, come to dominate
the behavior of the organisms in question.
Lombardo (1985) has used a tit-for-tat analy-
sis as a model of the parenting behavior of
tree swallows in the wild, and Milinski (1987)
and Dugatkin (1988) have argued for the use
of a tit-for-tat analysis in their work with three-
spined sticklebacks and guppies, respectively.
However, such analyses assume, but in no way
demonstrate, the pay-off matrix necessary for
tit for tat, and are open to alternative expla-
nations (e.g., Lazarus & Metcalfe, 1990; Mas-
ters & Waite, 1990).
In a related line of research, nonhuman
animals have been placed in generalized pri-
soner's dilemmas as a method of studying the
patterns of behavior that evolve not over
thousands of generations but over several tri-
als in the lifetime of one player. This ap-
proach was first advocated by Rapoport, Guy-
er, and Gordon (1976) because it would have
"the advantage of permitting iterated games
of practically any length and also [reflect] be-
havior which is probably motivated by noth-
ing other than the payoffs" (p. 129). In this
vein, Gardner, Corbin, Beltramo, and Nickell
(1984) released pairs of rats into two T maz-
es. By turning in one direction at the end of
the maze, each rat could "cooperate"; by
turning in the other direction, each could
"defect." The T mazes had a common Plexi-
glas wall that allowed each rat to see the other
and to see the other's choice. The rats re-
ceived their pay-offs (various amounts of
food) in goal boxes at the end of the maze.
In both this condition and one in which the
Plexiglas wall was covered with cardboard so
the rats could not see each other, mutual de-
fection was by far the most common joint r,-
sponse. Flood, Lendenmann, and Rapoport
(1983) used two adjoining operant condition-
ing chambers to pit rats against one another
in the prisoner's dilemma and three other 2
X 2 games. The adjoining wall of the cham-
bers was made of coarse wire mesh that al-
lowed the rats to see, hear, and smell one an-
other. Each rat could cooperate or defect by
pressing one of two levers in its chamber, and
the pay-offs came in the form of different de-
lays to a food reinforcer (shorter delays were
assumed to have greater utility). In the pri-
soner s dilemma condition, near fixations on
defection and one complete fixation were oh
served in 8 of the 12 subjects, with only 1
responding cooperatively. Both the Gardner
et al. and Flood et al. studies are difficult to
interpret, however, because the strategy of
the subject's opponent was not controlled.
Because the strategy of one player determines
the optimal choice of the other, it is not pos-
sible to draw any conclusions from these stud-
ies about whether individual rats respond op-
timally in a generalized prisoner's dilemma.
In the present study, therefore, we attempt-
ed to see how an animal behaves in an iter-
ated prisoner's dilemma game, while we ma-
nipulated what is arguably its more
interesting variable-the strategy of the other
player. Because the optimal choice when play-
ing an iterated prisoner's dilemma game de-
pends on both the pay-off matrix and the
strategy being used by the other player, con-
trolling and varying these outcomes and strat-
egies is the way to determine whether an an-
imal is behaving so as to maximize its
cumulative pay-off. Against an opponent who
defects on every trial or who cooperates on
every trial, for example, pure defection would
be optimal. In fact, pure defection is optimal
against an opponent playing any noncontin-
gent strategy, that is, a strategy that is not af-
fected by the prior choices of the other play-
er. Against certain contingent strategies,
however, pure cooperation or a mix of co-
operation and defection may be optimal.
As used in describing the present experi-
ments, a strategy can be likened to a schedule
of reinforcement. Both are rules for the de-
livery of consequences. Delivery of those con-
sequences is determined by the past and pres-
ent behavior of the organism and the strategy
(schedule) of the opponent. Pay-off matrix
values are analogous to reinforcer magni-
tudes. In social situations, each individual's
behavior represents a strategy in that one in-
dividual's behavior serves as a schedule of re-
inforcement for the other's behavior. A ques-
tion of importance, and one that is the focus
of the present experiments, is what aspects of
an opponent's strategy control the behavior
of an organism.
The pigeons in the present study played it-
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erated prisoner's dilemma and other 2 X 2
games against strategies programmed on a
computer. One was a tit-for-tat (TFTl) strategy,
which dictates cooperation on the first trial
and on subsequent trials responds as its op-
ponent did on the previous trial. TFIT is a
strategy based on the notion of reciprocity,
and the optimal choice in such an iterated
prisoner's dilemma game would be to coop-
erate always. In computer tournaments, the
TFl' strategy was found to be extremely effec-
tive, earning a total average pay-off greater
than that earned by any of its opponents (Ax-
elrod, 1980a, 1980b).
In addition to TFI, a second strategy inves-
tigated in the present study was a random re-
sponse (RND) strategy, which had an equal
probability of cooperating or defecting on
any trial, independent of the pigeon's choice.
The rational choice in this case is to defect
always because, in the long term, defecting
yields a higher pay-off than cooperating does,
regardless of what RND chooses. Thus, if the
pigeons are sensitive to the overall pay-off
structure used, then they should cooperate
when playing against TFT and defect when
playing against RND. On the other hand, if
the pigeons' choices are controlled by the im-
mediately occurring trial outcomes, then they
should defect against both strategies. Defec-
tion would earn the greatest immediate re-
ward on each individual trial as well as the
greatest overall total reward when played
against RND. However, when played against
TFI', defection would earn the immediately
larger reward on each individual trial but a
much lower total reward over the series of





Two female White Carneau pigeons (22W
and 25), with previous experience pecking re-
sponse keys for mixed grains, were main-
tained at 80% of their caged free-feeding
weights via supplementary feeding following
experimental sessions. Water and grit were
continuously available in their home cages.
Apparatus
The experimental space was a Coulbourn
Instruments pigeon chamber measuring 25
cm across the front panel, 27.5 cm from front
to back, and 30 cm in height. The chamber
was housed in a sound- and light-attenuating
enclosure located in a room separate from
that which contained the Apple lIcg comput-
er that controlled and recorded experimental
events.
The front panel of the chamber contained
two response keys, a triple cue lamp, a house-
light, and an opening that provided access to
a pellet feeder. The response keys were 2.5
cm in diameter and were aligned vertically on
the left third of the panel. They were 5 cm
apart center to center, with the center of the
lower key 19 cm from the floor. Each key
could be transilluminated with red and green
light and required a force of at least 0.2 N to
operate. The center third of the panel con-
tained both the triple cue-lamp module and
the feeder opening. The three cuelights were
8 cm from the ceiling and were aligned hor-
izontally, 2 cm from center to center. The
cuelights were type 1829 bulbs covered with
a yellow, blue, or white plastic cap. Only the
blue cuelight and yellow cuelight were used.
The rectangular feeder opening (5.5 cm high
by 5 cm across) was located 10 cm below the
cuelights and 7 cm from the floor. Food de-
liveries consisted of differing numbers of 45-
mg Noyes food pellets and were accompanied
by illumination of a type 1829 bulb located
within the opening of the feeder. All other
sources of illumination were extinguished
during food deliveries. The houselight was
centered on the right third of the front
panel, 2 cm from the ceiling, with the light
deflected upward.
Procedure
The pigeons were first trained to peck the
red and green keys by an autoshaping pro-
cedure and were then placed directly on the
first experimental condition. Experimental
sessions were conducted daily and consisted
of 55 outcome trials, the first five of which
were warm-ups and were not included in the
data collection. Each trial was 25 s in length
and began with the illumination of the house-
light for a minimum of 2 s, after which the
red and green response keys were illuminat-
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ed for a maximum of 10 s or until the pigeon
pecked one of the keys. Whether the top key
was red and the bottom key green, or vice
versa, was determined randomly on each tri-
al. When the pigeon pecked one of the two
keys, that key remained illuminated for an-
other 6 s while the other key was extin-
guished. During the final 3 s, either the blue
or yellow cuelight was also illuminated, after
which the response key, cuelight, and house-
light were extinguished for 7 s during which
the feeder was illuminated and the appropri-
ate number of food pellets was delivered, one
every 0.5 s. If the bird did not peck one of
the response keys within 10 s of their illumi-
nation, then all lights in the chamber were
extinguished for the remainder of the trial.
To maintain a constant 25-s trial duration, the
latency to peck was subtracted from the 10 s
maximum time permitted, and the remaining
time was then added to the beginning of the
next trial.
The computer was programmed to play
TFT and RND strategies. In the TFT condi-
tion, the computer responded to the pigeon
by making the same choice as that made by
the pigeon on the preceding trial. Thus, if
the pigeon had "cooperated" on the fourth
trial, the computer would "cooperate" on the
fifth trial. The only exception to this strategy
was the first trial of each session, on which
the computer always cooperated. In the RND
condition, the computer randomly cooperat-
ed on half the trials and defected on half the
trials, independent of the pigeon's choices.
The pigeon cooperated by pecking the red
response key and defected by pecking the
green response key. The blue cuelight sig-
naled cooperation on the part of the com-
puter and the yellow cuelight signaled defec-
tion. The pay-off matrix for TFT and RND is
shown in Table 1 (under prisoner's dilem-
ma). Cooperation by the pigeon (selection of
the red key) and cooperation by the comput-
er (illumination of the blue cuelight) result-
ed in a three-pellet pay-off. If the pigeon de-
fected (selected the green key) and the
computer cooperated (illumination of the
blue cuelight), the pigeon earned five pellets.
If the pigeon cooperated (selected the red
key) and the computer defected (illumina-
tion of the yellow cuelight), the pigeon
earned zero pellets. If both the pigeon and
the computer defected (selection of the
green key by the pigeon, accompanied by il-
lumination of the yellow cuelight), the pi-
geon earned one food pellet.
It is important to note that one cannot av-
erage across the row totals of Table 1 to pre-
dict the pay-offs to be received by the pigeon,
except when the pigeon is playing against the
RND strategy. That is, the pigeon's obtained
pay-off for a cooperation is not equal to the
average of the two possible pay-offs, namely
the pay-off for a cooperation given a com-
puter cooperation and the pay-off for a co-
operation given a computer defection. Like-
wise, the pigeon's obtained pay-off for a
defection is, in general, not equal to the av-
erage of the two possible pay-offs given the
two possible computer responses. This is be-
cause, with the exception of the RND strate-
gy, the relative frequencies with which the pi-
geon receives the two possible pay-offs for a
given response depends on its pattern of re-
sponding.
Each bird was studied against both strate-
gies, with Bird 25 playing against TFI' and
Bird 22W playing against RND to begin the
experiment. Furthermore, the meanings of
the response key and cuelight colors were re-
versed several times. In Condition 1, the red
Table 1
Pay-off matrices for the different 2 X 2 games studied in the present experiments. Only the
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keylight and the blue cuelight represented
cooperation by the pigeon and the computer,
respectively, and the green keylight and the
yellow cuelight represented defection by the
pigeon and the computer, respectively. In
Condition 2, the meanings of these colors
were reversed so that green and yellow rep-
resented cooperation and red and blue rep-
resented defection. In Condition 3, the colors
were returned to their original meanings. In
Condition 4, Bird 25 was transferred to the
RND condition and Bird 22W was transferred
to the TFT condition. The meanings of the
keylight and cuelight colors were again re-
versed in Condition 5, and were changed
back again to their original meanings in Con-
dition 6.
Both birds were then studied against a TFT-
dom strategy, in which the computer played
a tit-for-tat strategy, but with the pay-off struc-
ture of the game altered (as shown in Table
1) so that cooperation was now the dominant
response. That is, no matter what choice the
computer made, the pigeon would maximize
its current pay-off by cooperating.2 If the pi-
geon cooperated and the computer cooper-
ated in this condition, the bird earned three
food pellets as in the previous condition. If
the pigeon defected and the computer co-
operated, the bird earned zero pellets. If the
pigeon cooperated but the computer defect-
ed, the bird earned two pellets. If both the
pigeon and the computer defected, then, as
before, the bird earned one pellet. Following
this condition (Condition 7), the meanings of
the keylight and cuelight colors were reversed
(Condition 8), followed by a return to their
original meanings (Condition 9).
Conditions 10 and 11 were a return to the
original pay-off matrix with both pigeons
studied under the TFT contingencies. Con-
dition 11 differed from Condition 10 only in
that the meanings of the keylight and cue-
light colors were reversed once more.
Table 2 presents the order of the experi-
mental conditions. Conditions changed when
both birds met the following criteria: They
completed a minimum of 15 sessions, and the
2Note that the game played under TFT-dom is tech-
nically no longer a prisoner's dilemma game because its
pay-off values do not satisfy the inequalities previously
stipulated. We continue to use the terms cooperate and
defect in discussing TFT-dom, however, for the sake of sim-
plicity.
Table 2
Order of experimental conditions and the median num-
ber of cooperations and pellets earned from the last five




coopera- pellets Maxi- Mini-
Bird Conditiona tionsb earned mum mum
25 1. TFT 0 50 150 50
2. TFT-rev 6 68 150 50
3. TFT 6 68 150 50
4. RND 4 140 150 75
5. RND-rev 8 136 150 75
6. RND 9 133 150 75
7. TFT-dom 49 146 150 25
8. TFT-dom-rev 47 137 150 25
9. TFT-dom 50 150 150 25
10. TFT 2 55 150 50
11. TFT-rev 4 62 150 50
22W 1. RND 1 149 150 75
2. RND-rev 1 145 150 75
3. RND 7 139 150 75
4. TFT 1 53 150 50
5. TFT-rev 50 150 150 50
6. TFT 0 50 150 50
7. TFT-dom 50 150 150 25
8. TFT-dom-rev 50 150 150 25
9. TFT-dom 50 150 150 25
10. TFT 0 50 150 50
11. TFF-rev 1 53 150 50
a TFT represents the tit-for-tat strategy; RND represents
the random strategy; rev represents a reversal in the
meaning of the colors; dom represents a change in the
payoff matrix of the tit-for-tat strategy to one in which
the dominant response is to cooperate.
b The number of cooperations could vary between 0
and 50.
last five sessions werejudged by two observers
to be stable with no apparent trend in either
bird's choice responding. Conditions were
studied for an average of 30 sessions each.
RESULTS
The median numbers of cooperations and
pellets earned from the last five sessions on
each condition for each pigeon are shown in
Table 2. Also presented are the maximum
and minimum number of pellets possible in
each condition. Against the TFT and RND
conditions (Conditions 1 through 6), the
birds defected on most of the trials. Bird 25
defected under the TFI and RND conditions
and continued to defect when the meanings
of the colors were reversed and then re-
turned to their original meanings. Bird 22W
defected on almost all the trials under all
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three of the RND conditions and continued
to defect when transferred to the TFE con-
dition. However, when the colors were re-
versed, Bird 22W demonstrated an apparent
color bias (continuing to peck the red key),
thus cooperating; when the colors were re-
turned to their original meanings, the bird
defected on all the trials.
In Conditions 7 through 9, the pay-off ma-
trix was changed so that now the dominant
response was to cooperate. Both birds under
the TFT-dom condition came to cooperate on
almost all trials, even when the meanings of
the colors were reversed (Condition 8) and
when they were returned to their original
meanings (Condition 9). When then placed
on the original pay-off matrix (Condition 10),
both birds under the TFT condition returned
to their previous behavior of defecting on al-
most all trials and continued to defect when
the meanings of the colors were reversed
once more (Condition 11). The change in
behavior from cooperation under TFE-dom
to defection under TFE also produced a de-
crease in number of pellets earned from the
maximum of 150 to close to the minimum of
50.
DISCUSSION
Under the TFE and RND conditions, the
birds' choices approached pure defection. In
only one of the five TFI conditions, and only
for 1 bird (Condition 5, TFE-rev, Bird 22W),
did cooperation predominate. Upon reversal
of the meaning of the colors and in all sub-
sequent TFE conditions, however, this bird
defected, supporting the supposition that this
one instance of cooperation was a temporary
color bias. Thus, when playing against the
RND condition, the pigeons' choices were
nearly optimal-almost all defections-earn-
ing close to the maximum number of food
pellets. When playing against the TFE con-
dition, on the other hand, the pigeons be-
haved far from optimally; they overwhelming-
ly defected when it would have been in their
long-term interest to cooperate. Consequent-
ly, they earned close to the minimum number
of food pellets.
Why did the pigeons not cooperate against
TEI? To expect the pigeons to cooperate
against TFE, it must first be assumed that the
psychological values (utilities) associated with
the pay-offs, in addition to their numerical
values, satisfy the inequalities of the priso-
ner's dilemma game. Of course, this may not
have been the case. It may have been, for ex-
ample, that the pigeons were not sensitive to
the differences among the pay-offs. If S, P, R,
and T were approximately psychologically
equivalent for the pigeons, then all possible
choices would have been equivalent too, and
there would have been no reason to expect
pure cooperation. However, there also would
be no reason to expect the pure defection
that was observed, thus arguing against psy-
chological equivalence of the pay-offs as a
likely explanation.
Moreover, the illumination of the cuelight
that signified the computer's response had a
clear effect on the birds' behavior. For ex-
ample, in the first condition, the blue cue-
light was correlated with a larger number of
food pellets than was the yellow cuelight
(three or five pellets compared to zero or one
pellet). In this, as well as in the relevant con-
ditions of the later experiments, the pigeons
were observed to behave differentially to
these cuelights: sustained and vigorous peck-
ing at or grasping within their beaks of the
blue light, but litfie, if any, pecking at the yel-
low light. This consistently observed finding
further suggests that the birds were sensitive
to the difference in pay-offs.
In addition, results from the TFT-dom con-
dition demonstrate that the birds were sen-
sitive to the differences in pay-off values.
Because of the pay-off matrix in TFT-dom,
the pigeon would maximize its current pay-
off by cooperating. Clearly, then, if the birds
are sensitive to pay-off differences in the
range of zero to five food pellets, they should
engage in pure cooperation against TF-
dom, which, in fact, they did.
To expect the pigeons to cooperate when
playing against TFT, it must be assumed that
they integrate over several trials of the iter-
ated prisoner's dilemma game. That is to say,
not only must they remember the outcomes
of previous trials, but they also must be suf-
ficienfly sensitive to potential outcomes more
than one trial in advance. It could be, how-
ever, that the birds, although in fact playing
what we call an iterated prisoner's dilemma
game, were responding to each trial as if it
were a discrete event. Thus, defection would
indeed be the optimal response on each trial.
This is so because on a single trial, defection
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(as opposed to cooperation) would earn five
rather than three food pellets were the com-
puter to cooperate, and would earn one rath-
er than zero pellets were the computer to de-
fect. Notice also that after a pigeon defected
on TFI and earned either one or five pellets
on trial t, there was a disincentive for the bird
to cooperate on trial t + 1 because it would
then receive the sucker's pay-off-no food
pellets. The fact that three pellets would be
earned on trial t + 2, and on all subsequent
trials if the bird continued to cooperate, may
not have controlled the birds' choices, es-
pecially given their steep discounting of de-
layed outcomes (Kagel & Green, 1987). Con-
sequenfly, it is not unreasonable to assume
that future trials, because of their temporal
distance from the current trial, were not
taken into account; immediate rewards deter-
mined choice.
It is obviously quite important to establish
the birds' sensitivity to differences in pay-off
values in the range of zero to five pellets, and
the fact that the birds overwhelmingly coop-
erated under the three TFT-dom conditions
seems to be evidence for this sensitivity. Con-
sider the following possibility, however: The
birds were only sensitive to whether or not
they received a positive pay-off. That is, they
could distinguish S, a pay-off of zero pellets,
from P, R, or T, but they could not distinguish
P, R, or T from one another. Thus, although
a normative prediction of the birds' behavior
against TFI' would fail, the avoidance of a
zero pay-off would explain the behavior
against both the TFI' and the TFT-dom con-
ditions. Against both, the birds preferred
whichever alternative never resulted in a pay-
off of zero. This possibility, along with further
indirect tests of temporal discounting, were
tested in Experiment 2.
EXPERIMENT 2
The second experiment examined whether
the results of Experiment 1 were due to the
pigeons' avoidance of the zero pay-off. Such
behavior on the part of the pigeon would
lead to defection when playing against the
RND and the TFI' computer strategies but
would lead to cooperation against the TFF-
dom strategy. To this end, the pay-off matrix
of TFI was changed by incrementing all the
numbers of pay-offs by one food pellet. If the
birds are sensitive to the different numbers
of pellets delivered, continued defection
would argue against their having responded
so as to avoid the zero pay-off. In addition to
this change, the dominant strategy, as well as
the original TFTl strategy, were again tested.
To strengthen further the conclusion that
the pigeons were more likely to play the pri-
soner's dilemma game (as constructed here)
only one trial in advance, and that their be-
havior was sensitive to the local contingen-
cies, a new condition, "chicken," was studied.
The idea behind chicken is that mutual de-
fection leads to the worst outcome for both
players. The situation is likened to that of two
teen-age drivers heading toward each other
in their cars; the one who swerves aside first
is "chicken." Yet if neither swerves, both lose.
In the game of chicken, constructed in the
present experiment such that the computer
responds as the pigeon did on the preceding
trial, mutual cooperation yields a pay-off of
three pellets (as was true under TFT), but
mutual defection yields a pay-off of zero pel-
lets. If the pigeon cooperates and the com-
puter defects, the pigeon earns one pellet; if
the pigeon defects and the computer coop-
erates, the pigeon earns five pellets. Under
chicken, pure defection produces the lowest
possible pay-off; defection does not complete-
ly dominate cooperation on each play of the
game as it does under TFL. The optimal be-
havior against chicken is either pure coop-
eration, thus earning 150 pellets per game,
or alternating between cooperation and de-
fection, thus earning one and five pellets, re-
spectively, totaling 150 per game. If the pi-
geons are only playing one trial in advance,
as the previous results suggest, then they
might be expected to intersperse defection
with cooperation rather than always to coop-
erate. Under chicken there is still the incen-
tive to defect after a cooperation (thereby
earning five pellets by defecting rather than
three by cooperating). But unlike TFI, there
is also an incentive to switch back to cooper-
ation following a defection because such a re-
sponse produces one pellet, whereas contin-
ued defection produces none.
Finally, each entry in the pay-off matrix was
doubled under TFT to test whether defection
would continue when substantially greater
pay-offs are provided. There is some evidence
(although it is inconclusive) in the literature
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on prisoner's dilemma with humans that
large pay-offs engender greater levels of co-
operation (see, e.g., Insko et al., 1993).
METHOD
Subjects and Apparatus
The same 2 pigeons (22W and 25) and the
same apparatus from Experiment 1 were
used.
Procedure
All details of procedure were the same as
those in Experiment 1. The first experimen-
tal condition studied was the final TFE' strat-
egy from Experiment 1, but with the re-
sponse-key and cuelight colors returned to
their original meanings. The second condi-
tion was also a TFL condition, but with the
pay-off matrix changed such that each out-
come was incremented by one pellet from
that under the original TFT1 strategy (re-
ferred to as TFI + 1) (see Table 1). The
meanings of the keylights and cuelights were
reversed for Condition 3 (TF' + 1-rev), fol-
lowed by a return to their original meanings
in Condition 4 (TFI + 1).
In Condition 5, the pay-off structure was
changed to that of chicken (see Table 1). As
under TFEL, if the pigeon and the computer
cooperate, the bird earns three food pellets;
if the pigeon defects and the computer co-
operates, the bird earns five pellets. However,
if the pigeon cooperates and the computer
defects, the bird earns one pellet, whereas if
both pigeon and computer defect, the bird
earns none.
In Condition 6, the birds were studied
against the TEIL-dom condition, followed by
the original TFT strategy in Condition 7. In
Condition 8, the pay-off matrix under TEI'
was doubled (TEI' X 2), with the meanings
of the keylights and cuelights reversed for
Condition 9 (TF X 2-rev). Table 3 presents
the order of the experimental conditions.
Each condition was studied for an average of
36 sessions.
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
The median numbers of cooperations and
pellets earned from the last five sessions on
each condition for each pigeon are presented
in Table 3. Also shown are the minimum and
maximum number of pellets possible under
each of the conditions. As before, both birds
Table 3
Order of experimental conditions and the median num-
ber of cooperations and pellets earned from the last five




of coop- pellets Maxi- Mini-
Bird Conditiona erationsb earned mum mum
25 1. TF[ 3 63 150 50
2. TFT + 1 2 102 200 100
3. TFT + 1-rev 0 100 200 100
4. TFT + 1 5 114 200 100
5. Chicken 25 126 150 0
6. TFT-dom 49 146 150 25
7. TFT 2 56 150 50
8. TFT x 2 0 100 300 100
9. TFT x 2-rev 1 106 300 100
22W 1. TFIT 2 56 150 50
2. TFT + 1 3 109 200 100
3. TFIT + 1-rev 3 109 200 100
4. TFT + 1 1 103 200 100
5. Chicken 25 117 150 0
6. TFT-dom 49 146 150 25
7. TFT 2 56 150 50
8. TFT X 2 1 106 300 100
9. TFT X 2-rev 3 118 300 100
aTFT represents the tit-for-tat strategy; TFT + 1 rep-
resents the tit-for-tat strategy with all outcomes increased
by one pellet; dom represents a change in the payoff
matrix of the tit-for-tat strategy to one in which the dom-
inant response is to cooperate; TFT X 2 represents the
tit-for-tat strategy with the number of pellets per outcome
doubled; rev represents a reversal in the meaning of the
colors.
bThe number of cooperations could vary between 0
and 50.
defected on almost all of the trials when play-
ing against the TF' strategy, earning close to
the minimum number of pellets. When the
number of pellets for each outcome was then
incremented by one, the birds continued to
defect on almost all the trials, continuing to
earn close to the minimum. Defection contin-
ued when the meanings of the colors were
reversed in Condition 3 and when they were
then returned to their original meanings
(Condition 4). Clearly, avoidance of a zero
pay-off cannot explain the results of these ex-
periments.
When the computer strategy was changed
to Chicken, Birds 25 and 22W cooperated on
half the trials, earning 84% and 78% of the
maximum number of pellets, respectively.
When then placed on the TFF-dom strategy
(Condition 6), each came to cooperate on
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just about every trial, earning near the max-
imum. Upon return to the original TFT strat-
egy, the birds markedly reduced their coop-
erations, defecting on all but two trials each.
When the number of pellets per outcome was
doubled (Condition 8), the birds continued
to defect on almost all trials. Defection con-
tinued under Condition 9 when the mean-
ings of the colors were reversed.
The pattern of these results suggests that
(a) the birds were sensitive to the pay-off val-
ues used, (b) the birds altered their choices
according to the strategy of the computer op-
ponent, (c) the TFT results were not due to
only one set of pay-off values having been
studied, and (d) the pigeons did not respond
to the overall pay-off structure, but instead
were overly influenced by the pay-off of the
immediately occurring trial. The birds'
marked discounting of delayed outcomes is
even more apparent when one considers that
upon a reversal in the meaning of the colors
under TFI, the birds initially continued to
peck the same key color as they had during
the final days of the previous condition, con-
sequently tripling their number of pellets
earned. Yet they subsequently changed to
pecking the other color and thus decreased
their pellets earned from the maximum to
close to the minimum. This is illustrated in
Figure 2, in which the final 5 days on the TFT
condition are presented followed by the 31
days on the TFT-rev condition (Conditions 10
and 11 from Experiment 1). Plotted are the
number of choices of the red key and the
number of food pellets earned. During TFT,
red meant cooperate; during the reversal, red
meant defect. In the TFT condition, both
birds were defecting (pecking green) and
earning near the minimum number of pel-
lets. When the meanings of the colors were
then reversed, each bird initially continued to
peck the green key, nearly tripling its earn-
ings. Yet, after five or 16 sessions for Birds 25
and 22W, respectively, choice shifted to the
red (defect) key and the number of pellets
earned dropped from the maximum to near
minimum (from 150 food pellets in the first
session of TFT-rev to 56 and 50 food pellets
in the final session). A similar analysis holds
for the change from TFT-dom to TFI.
In order to make comparisons across the
various conditions from Experiments 1 and 2
in terms of how the choices of the pigeons
influenced their earnings, taking into ac-
count that there were different minimum
and maximum numbers of pellets that could
be earned in the various conditions, the per-
centage of the difference between the mini-
mum and the maximum number of pellets
possible that was actually earned was calculat-
ed for Birds 25 and 22W for each condition
according to the following equation: [ (pellets
earned - min)/ (max - min)] X 100. A val-
ue of zero indicates that the bird earned the
minimum number of pellets in that condi-
tion; a value of 100 indicates that the bird
earned the maximum number of pellets in
that condition. The results for each bird for
each condition are presented in Figure 3; the
mean of all replications of a given condition
is shown. The horizontal lines indicate the
percentage of pellets that would be earned if
the pigeon were to respond randomly.
Against all three of the TET conditions (TEI,
TEI' + 1, TEl X 2), the pigeons earned little
more than the minimum number of pellets;
Bird 25 received an average of only 5.7%, and
Bird 22W earned only 10% of the difference,
even less than the 62.5% they would have
earned had they responded randomly. This
contrasts with the 78% to 99% earned when
playing against the TFI-dom, chicken, and
RND strategies, where earned pellets ap-
proached the maximum.
EXPERIMENT 3
A final experiment extended the generality
and robustness of the previous results. Over
the 10 TEI' conditions studied in Experiment
1, there was only one case of cooperation;
over the 14 TEIT conditions in Experiment 2,
there was no case of cooperation. Despite
these facts, the small number of subjects stud-
ied might be cause for wariness. Consequent-
ly, 7 additional birds were studied against two
different computer strategies in the final ex-
periment. Both TFI and TEF-dom were ex-
amined to see whether defection would be
obtained reliably under the former and co-




Seven male White Carneau pigeons, with






Fig. 2. Number of red choices and pellets earned for the final five sessions of TFT and the 31 sessions of TFT-
rev (Conditions 10 and 11, respectively, of Experiment 1) for Birds 25 and 22W. During TFT, red meant cooperate;
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Fig. 3. Mean percentage of the difference between the minimum and the maximum number of food pellets
possible that was earned by Birds 25 and 22W in each condition.
grains, were maintained as in the prior ex-
periments. The apparatus was the same as
that used previously.
Procedure
The pigeons were first trained to peck the
red and green keylights for food pellets by an
autoshaping procedure and were then placed
on the first of three experimental conditions.
All details of the procedure were the same as
those in Experiments 1 and 2. The red key-
light and blue cuelight represented coopera-
tion by the pigeon and computer, respective-
ly, and the green keylight and yellow cuelight
represented defection by the pigeon and the
computer, respectively. Each bird was studied
against both TFT and TFT-dom, with the pay-
offs as noted in Table 1.
For 3 of the birds (15, 16, and 17) the first
experimental condition was TFT. After 15 ses-
sions, the condition was changed to TFI1-dom
for 15 sessions, followed by a return to TFT
for 45 sessions. The other 4 birds (6, 7, 9, 10)
were studied in the reverse order: TfI-dom
followed by TFT and then a return to TFI-
dom. TFT-dom was studied for 15 sessions (30
for Bird 9 on its replication) and TFIT was
studied for 30 or 60 sessions.
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
The median number of cooperations (red
key choices) from the last 5 days is shown in
Figure 4 for each bird for all conditions in
the order in which they were studied. It is
clear that defection (green key choices) was
the consistent steady-state response when
playing against the TFT conditions, whereas
cooperation occurred against TFT-dom. The
difference in the median number of cooper-
ations during the birds' first exposure to TET
and during their first exposure to TFT-dom
was statistically significant (t = 19.34, p <
.001), as was the difference in number of pel-
lets earned (t = 13.31, p < .001).
The mean number of cooperations aver-
aged across all 7 birds under all 10 TFl con-
ditions (based on the medians of the last five
sessions of each condition) was 4.5 (out of a
possible 50) whereas for the 11 TF-dom con-
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BIRD
Fig. 4. Median number of cooperations from the fi-
nal five sessions under TFI and TFT-dom, in the order
in which these conditions were studied for each bird in
Experiment 3. Dark bars represent results from TFT con-
ditions; lighter bars represent results from TFT-dom con-
ditions.
was 49.5. The corresponding mean number
of pellets earned under TFI' was 62.9 (the
minimum possible being 50 and the maxi-
mum being 150); under TFF-dom, the mean
number of pellets earned was 148.2 (with the
minimum being 25 and the maximum being
150). The percentage of the difference be-
tween the minimum and the maximum num-
ber of pellets possible that was actually
earned averaged 12.9% and 98.5% against
TF' and TFT-dom, respectively.
Session-by-session results are presented for
Birds 15, 16, and 17 in Figure 5. Plotted are
the number of cooperations (choices of the
red key) for each of the 15 days of the TFT
and the TFT-dom conditions. For the repli-
cations of the TFF condition, the medians of
3-day blocks are plotted because this replica-
tion was studied for 45 days. Notice that all 3
birds came to defect (choose green) during
the initial TFT condition and earned only 64,
56, and 50 pellets, respectively, on the 15th
session. When the computer strategy was
changed to TFT-dom, each bird switched to
pecking the red (cooperation) key, almost tri-
pling the number of pellets earned. This
change was apparent within 5 or 6 days. In-
terestingly, when the computer strategy was
then returned to TFI, the birds initially con-
tinued pecking red and thus continued to
earn close to the maximum number of pel-
lets. Indeed, for the first 2 days, Birds 15, 16,
and 17 cooperated an average of 45, 49, and
50 trials and earned 145, 149, and 149 pellets.
However, with further exposure to the TFT
condition, each bird shifted its choice to the
green (defect) key, and the number of pellets
earned dropped from near maximum to
close to the minimum (53, 67, and 68 pellets
on the final session of TFI). This pattern of
behavior replicated that of the previous ex-
periments.
These results thus support further the con-
clusions from Experiments 1 and 2: When
playing against TFI, the birds defected. How-
ever, the birds were sensitive to the pay-off
structure and altered their responses accord-
ingly: When TFT-dom was instituted, the
birds altered their choice to one of cooper-
ating. Once again, when cooperation earned
the greatest immediate as well as overall total
reward, as was true under TFT-dom, the birds
cooperated. However, when cooperation
earned the greatest overall reward but defec-
tion earned the greatest immediate reward,
as was the case under TFT, the birds defected.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
In general, the pigeons' choice responding
on 2 X 2 games was controlled by the rein-
forcer outcomes of the immediately occur-
ring trial, with the pigeons choosing the out-
come with the immediately higher pay-off.
The birds maximized overall reward only
when such behavior was consistent with max-
imizing reward on the immediately occurring
trial. When maximizing overall reward was in-
consistent with maximizing reward on the im-
mediate trial, the birds responded to the im-
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mediate reward situation. Such behavior
considerably reduced total pellets earned un-
der certain conditions. The birds cooperated
only when such behavior achieved the high-
est immediate reward (e.g., against TFT-
dom).
Although it would have been in the pi-
geons' long-term best interest always to co-
operate when playing the prisoner's dilemma
game against an opponent using a tit-for-tat
strategy, they failed to do so. Instead, by al-
most always defecting, the birds earned only
about one third of the number of food pellets
that they could have earned if they had co-
operated. To expect any player always to co-
operate when playing a prisoner's dilemma
against an opponent using a tit-for-tat strate-
gy, it must be assumed that the player inte-
grates over several trials of the iterated pri-
soner's dilemma game. The pigeons, perhaps
because of their steep temporal discount
functions (Green, Fisher, Perlow, & Sherman,
1981; Kagel & Green, 1987), did not do this.
Thus, they made the dominant response, to
defect, on each trial.
The effects of temporal discounting on
rates of cooperation in the iterated prisoner's
dilemma game have been discussed by Axel-
rod (1984). Consider a player who would
earn a pay-off of three on each of some in-
definite number of trials by always cooperat-
ing against an opponent playing tit for tat.
On Trial 1, when the player must decide
which choice to make, the utility from coop-
erating is 3. The utility from cooperating on
Trial 2, however, is only a fraction of what it
is on Trial 1, and the utility from cooperating
on Trial 3 is a fraction of what it is on Trial
2, and so on. The weight (or importance) of
a later move relative to an earlier move is
called w, a discount parameter, which "rep-
resents the degree to which the payoff of
each move is discounted relative to the pre-
vious move" (Axelrod, 1984, p. 13). The larg-
er the value of w, the more the pay-offs from
later trials are taken into account in the cal-
culation of total pay-offs.
The total utility from always cooperating
for the player in question would be 3 + 3w
+ 3w2 + 3W0 .... The utility from always de-
fecting when the opponent is playing TFT, as-
suming T = 5 and P = 1, would be 5 + w +
W2 + W3 .... Axelrod (1984) notes that the
sum of this infinite series for 0 < w < 1 would
be 3/(1 - w) and 5 + [w/(I - w)] for the
two cases, respectively. For example, if w were
large, say .9, then the utility from always co-
operating would be 30 [i.e., 3/(1 - .9)],
whereas that from defecting would be 14 (5
+ [.9/(1 -.9)]). On the other hand, if w
were small, say .1, then the utility from co-
operating would be 3.3, whereas that from
defecting would be 5.1. In general, then, al-
ways cooperating maximizes a player's utility
only if w is sufficiently large; otherwise defec-
tion is the optimal choice. The steep dis-
counting by pigeons of future outcomes
(Green et al., 1981; Kagel & Green, 1987)
suggests that in the present study w was too
small to promote cooperation in the pigeons
playing against tit for tat.
In a related vein, the pigeons' behavior can
be seen as exhibiting a lack of self-control.
Self-control may be defined as the choosing
of a larger but delayed reward over a smaller
but more immediate reward. Lack of self-con-
trol, impulsiveness, is choosing the smaller
but more immediate reward over the larger
but delayed reward (Green, 1982; Logue,
1988). More generally, self-control can be
conceptualized as responding to the overall
molar reward contingencies, whereas impul-
siveness is responding to the more immediate
molecular reward contingencies. When faced
with a choice between a small reward at time
t and a larger reward at time t + x, pigeons
choose the small reward when the value of t
is small. Their preference reverses to that of
the larger reward as the time t is increased
(Green et al., 1981). In fact, pigeons will
come to make a commitment response when
the value of t is large in order to insure the
receipt of the larger reward. Such a commit-
ment response restricts future choice so that
as time to the rewards approaches, the pi-
geon cannot act on its reversal in preference
and select the smaller but more immediate
Fig. 5. Number of cooperations (red-key choices) for each session of TFT, TFT-dom, and (in blocks of 3-day
medians) the replication of TFT for Birds 15, 16, and 17.
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reward but now must receive the larger re-
ward (Rachlin & Green, 1972).
The pigeons in the present study faced sim-
ilar choice options against TFT. Following a
defection, the bird could cooperate and re-
ceive a larger reward (three pellets), but only
following a trial in which it must first receive
the zero-pellet outcome. On the other hand,
it could continue to defect and thus receive
a small reward (one pellet) on that trial.
Thus, the birds generally chose the smaller
but more immediate (one-pellet) reward to
that of the larger but delayed (three-pellet)
reward. Similarly, following a cooperation,
the bird could earn five pellets on that next
trial followed by one pellet on the ensuing
trials were it to defect repeatedly; on the oth-
er hand, it could earn three pellets on all of
the ensuing trials were it to continue to co-
operate. The birds generally opted for the im-
mediate benefit of five pellets (which would
then likely lead to future one-pellet rewards)
rather than to respond to the molar reward
contingencies and cooperate, which would
lead to future three-pellet rewards. In the pri-
soner's dilemma game as structured here, the
bird could not commit itself to the long-term,
higher valued outcome; it consequently de-
fected and thus earned an overall lower val-
ued but more immediate outcome.
The present results may have implications
for the study of cooperation and competition
in both nonhuman animals and in humans.
Any implications and generalizations, howev-
er, must be tempered in light of the fact that
as an initial foray into the field, the present
work examined behavior under a limited set
of matrix values and other parameters. Even
though the pay-offs were varied over a rea-
sonably meaningful range, still greater varia-
tions in relative and absolute size of the pay-
offs are in order. It also is to be noted that
only positive consequences were used. The ef-
fects of a mixed-outcome matrix remain to bc
evaluated. With such caveats in mind, how-
ever, we suggest that the ability to learn to
respond optimally in a generalized prisoner's
dilemma game may be rare among certain
animals because of the problems of temporal
discounting and self-control. This is not to
say, of course, that animals would not come
to cooperate or cannot learn a tit-for-tat strat-
egy or that it has not evolved under certain
well-defined domains. Clearly, the ability to
learn from experience is also a product of
evolution (Skinner, 1966; Staddon, 1988), but
unless learning mechanisms have evolved to
be quite sensitive to future outcomes, the on-
togenetic development of cooperation under
a prisoner's dilemma situation would remain
a rarity in nonhuman animals that discount
delayed events so extensively. Indeed, dis-
counting future rewards may well be an adap-
tive response to uncertainty in an animal's
natural environment (Kagel, Green, & Cara-
co, 1986).
How, then, do our results relate to the issue
(raised in the Introduction) of how cooper-
ative behavior could have evolved among
populations of organisms that were initially
noncooperative? It has been proposed that if
members of a population were to appear
who, for whatever reason, play a tit-for-tat
strategy, then cooperation would evolve in
the population. If individuals were to play
TFT, they would earn greater pay-offs when
playing against each other than would those
who don't play TFIT when they play against
each other. In addition, when those playing
TFl play against those who don't, the TFT
players are no worse off than the others. Con-
sequently, TFTl offers a net advantage, and
once it enters the population, no individual
with a different pattern of behavior could do
as well.
The present work may serve as a bench-
mark for assessing this line of theorizing. The
computer was programmed to play TFTl and
in effect served as a probe for examining the
behavior that emerged in the pigeons. Grant-
ing the general assumptions of theories that
attempt to account for the evolution of co-
operation (e.g., that interactions between in-
dividuals in the population have a sufficiently
large probability of continuing; Axelrod &
Hamilton, 1981) and mindful of the caveats
noted earlier, the present results suggest that
cooperation does not evolve under circum-
stances such as those in the present study. Of
course, cooperative behavior might evolve
when rate of temporal discounting is consid-
erably lower, commitment responses are per-
mitted, or delays between choice and out-
come are sufficiently large. These possibilities
remain to be tested.
Humans are clearly more sensitive to fu-
ture outcomes than are pigeons, showing
shallower discount functions (Green, Fry, &
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Myerson, 1994; Rachlin, Raineri, & Cross,
1991). Outside of the laboratory, however, in-
tertrial times in a prisoner's dilemma-like sit-
uation may be years, decades, or generations,
rather than minutes. When such long time
spans are involved, temporal discounting may
be responsible in part for phenomena such
as continued defection by both players in an
arms race (see Snyder & Diesing, 1977) and
the general refusal among industrialized
nations to conserve natural resources. The
need to find ways of bringing long-term con-
sequences to bear on our immediate behav-
ior must be met if we are to live cooperatively
with each other and with our environment.
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